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BEFORE THE UNITED STATES ANTHRACITE 
COAL COMMISSION 


EMPLOYES EXHIBIT NUMBER 


IRREGULARITY OF EMPLOY¬ 
MENT IN THE ANTHRACITE 
INDUSTRY 


Presented by 

W. JETT LAUCK 

On behalf of 

John L. Lewis, President 
Philip Murray. Vice-President 
F. P. Hanaway, International Representative 
Percy Tetlow, Statistician 


John Dempsey 
Thomas Kennedy 
Chris. J. Golden 



Of the 


United Mine Workers of America 


WASHINGTON 



This exhibit was prepared under the 
supervision of 
W. JETT LAUCK 
by Leland Olds 


!>,' of Jo 

AUQ 24 j920 




BEFORE THE UNITED STATES ANTHRACITE 
COAL COMMISSION 


EMPLOYES EXHIBIT NUMBER- 


IRREGULARITY OF EMPLOY¬ 
MENT IN THE ANTHRACITE 
INDUSTRY 





Presented by 

W. JETT LAUCK 


On behalf of 


United Mine Workers of America 


WASHINGTON 

1920 

& *n ‘ 




K 









TABLE OF CONTENTS 

General Survey. 5 

I. Number of Days Worked in Coal Industry, 1881 to 1919.. 7 

II. Details of Days Worked for Period 1881 to 1919. 12 

III. Period of Over-Production, 1892 to 1901. 15 

IV. Period of Organization of the Market for Domestic Coal, 

1903 to 1908. 20 

V. The Anthracite Industry During the Past Decade. 24 

VI. Probable Irregularity in the Future. 36 

/ 









IRREGULARITY OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE 
ANTHRACITE INDUSTRY 

GENERAL SURVEY. 

In the coal mining industry the degree of regularity of operation 
is today as important a factor in earnings as is the level of hourly 
rates. As the industry operates on part time basis, the health of the 
family depends upon annual earnings, which are the product of the 
hourly rate by the number of hours of actual employment. In deter* 
mining rates of pay, therefore, it is important to form an estimate 
as to the probable number of days during which the worker will have 
an opportunity to earn the rate set. 

Data are available as to the number of days worked in the anthra¬ 
cite industry covering the period since 1881. During this period the 
variation has been very great. This variation is shown graphically 
on the accompanying table. The greatest number of days worked 
was 293 in the abnormal year 1918, while 1902, the year of the great 
anthracite strike, shows only 116 days of operation. For more nor¬ 
mal years the greatest number of days worked was 257, in 1913, 
while the lowest point came in 1897, with only 150 days of operation. 

A careful examination of the data presented in this report would 
seem to point to the following general conclusions in regard to the 
anthracite coal industry: 

(1) The anthracite mine workers have suffered more from irregu¬ 
larity of employment than have the bituminous mine workers. Not 
only is the average number of working days in anthracite lower than 
in bituminous mines, but the extremes are greater. 

During the period since 1881 the anthracite workers have had an 
opportunity to work on an average only 212 days out of each year. 
This means 92 days of idleness, 30 per cent of the working year, 
during which they have no opportunity to earn a living wage. In 
obtaining this average the abnormally low figure for 1902 due to 
the protracted strike has been left out, but the abnormally high 
figures for 1917 and 1918 have been included. Were the figure for 
1902 included, the average for anthracite would be even lower. 

This average, 212 working days, compares with 229 days of opera¬ 
tion in the bituminous mines of Pennsylvania, and with 216 in those 


4 B 


5 


6 


of the entire country. The bituminous figures represent averages 
for the period since 1892. If figures for the same period for anthra¬ 
cite had been averaged, the days worked would be found to be 210. 
Comparison with Pennsylvania bituminous is fairer because all the 
anthracite fields of major importance are in that State. 

(2) Shortage of labor does not enter appreciably into this prob¬ 
lem of a part-time industry,, the chief difficulty having been over¬ 
supply of labor as well as of capital. The sufferings of the workers 
from unemployment may be directly traced to a bad policy of in¬ 
vestment during the days of unregulated competition. This has not 
only injured the worker, but has also rendered high prices unavoid¬ 
able. 

(3) The problem of car shortage as a cause of irregularity, so 
much in evidence in the bituminous industry, has played so small a 
role in the anthracite industry as to be almost negligible. 

(4) The fundamental cause of irregularity has been “no market.” 
In other words, the equipment and labor force have been more than 
adequate to produce the supply which the market has been ready to 
absorb. The anthracite market has become primarily that of a 
domestic fuel. The determining factors in this market are, therefore, 
weather and growth of population. Other fuels are beginning to 
competp with anthracite in its own domestic sphere. In order to 
estimate the probable number of days which will be averaged in 
future years, it will be necessary to form a judgment as to the prob¬ 
able future of the market in relation to possible production. From 
this and from data for the last decade it would appear that the 
market for anthracite in the future will remain in a state of equi¬ 
librium at about the level for the years 1910 to 1916, inclusive. In 
other words, growth of population seems to be about balanced 
by the increasing competition of other fuels. 

(5) This will mean that the maximum average days per year 
which may fairly be expected will be about 242, leaving the worker 
to face unemployment for 20 per cent of the working year. From 
the consideration of other factors, discussed more at length in the 
following pages, this would appear to be a conservative estimate, 
the probability being that there will be more idle days rather than 
less. 

(6) It is probable that had there not been overinvestment in the 
anthracite industry, the problem could have been met by reducing 
the hours of labor without adding to the present price of anthracite 
coal. 


7 


I. 

NUMBER OF DAYS WORKED IN COAL INDUSTRY, 

1881 TO 1919. 

The following table affords a comprehensive survey of the entire 
problem. It will serve as a guide to the subsequent tables which 
consider the problem in greater detail. 

The data for this table are taken from Bulletin 115 of the Depart¬ 
ment of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Tables 124 and 126, supple¬ 
mented by material in the annual report on coal in the “Mineral 
Resources of the United States” and in recent reports of the United 
States Geological Survey. 


8 


DAYS WORKED IN THE ANTHRACITE COAL INDUSTRY, TOGETHER WITH 
OTHER DATA FOR COMPARISON. 


Year. 


Anthracite. 


Bituminous. 

No. men 
employed. 

r—Av. tonnage per man— > 
day. year. 

Days 

worked. 

r-Days worked—* 
Penna. U. S. 

1881. 

76,031 

1.90 

420 

221 



1882. 

82,200 

1.96 

427 

218 



1883. 

91,421 

1.81 

421 

232 



1884. 

101,073 

1.92 

368 

192 



1885. 

100,324 

1.87 

382 

204 



1886. 

103,044 

1.93 

379 

196 



1887. 

106,517 

1.90 

395 

208 



1888. 

122,218 

1.75 

381 

218 



1889. 

123,676 

1.90 

368 

194 



1890. 

126,000 

1.85 

369 

200 

232 

226 

1891. 

126,350 

1.98 

401 

203 

223 

233 

1892. 

129,050 

2.06 

407 

198 

223 

219 

1893. 

132,944 

2.06 

406 

197 

190 

204 

1894. 

131,603 

2.08 

395 

190 

165 

171 

1895. 

142,917 

2.07 

406 

196 

206 

194 

1896. 

148,991 

2.10 

365 

174 

206 

192 

1897. 

149,884 

2.34 

351 

150 

205 

196 

1898. 

145,504 

2.41 

367 

152 

229 

211 

1899. 

138,608 

2.50 

433 

173 

245 

234 

1900. 

144,206 

2.40 

398 

166 

242 

234 

1901. 

145,309 

2.37 

464 

196 

230 

225 

1902. 

148,141 

2.41 

279 

116 1 

248 

230 

1903. 

150,483 

2.41 

496 

206 

235 

225 

1904. 

155,861 

2.31 

469 

200 

196 

202 

1905. 

163,406 

2.19 

470 

215 

231 

211 

1906. 

162,355 

2.25 

439 

195 1 

281 

213 

1907. 

167,234 

2.33 

512 

220 

255 

234 

1908. 

174,174 

2.39 

478 

200 

2011 

1193 

1909 3 . 

1910. 

169,497 

2A7 

498 

229 

238 

217 

1911. 

173,940 

2.11 

520 

246 

233 

211 

1912. 

174,030 

2.10 

485 

2311 1 

252 

233 

1913. 

175,745 

2.03 

521 

257 | 

267 

232 

1914. 

179,679 

2.06 

505 

245 | 

2141 | 

2 195 

1915. 

176,552 

2.19 

504 

230 ! 

226 

1 203 

1916. 

159,869 

2.16 

548 

253 ! 

259 | 

230 

1917. 

154,174 

2.27 

646 

285 ! 

261 1 

243 

1918. 

147,121 

2.28 

672 

293 ! 

269 

249 

1919. 

Average for e 

ntire period 


1 

.i 

i 

252-262 2 | 

212 

1 

229 

2 208 

216 


1 Years when there were important stoppages of work pending adjustment of 
wages, etc. 

2 Estimated. 

3 No data for 1909. 




























































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10 


A cursory glance at this table might lead to the conclusion that 
irregularity has been largely eliminated. Beginning with the year 
1900, a steady improvement is evident, which apparently culminates 
in the year 1918 with 293 days of employment. From this it might 
be concluded that with the growth of population the industry has 
achieved what is practically a full working year. Such a judgment 
would fail to take account of the actual interplay of forces deter¬ 
mining the number of days work. A more thorough study covering 
the 30-year period ending with the present year will show clearly 
that the climax of this tendency toward regularity was reached in 
the years 1910 to 1916, when the mines were operated only 80 per 
cent of the year, and that the years 1917 and 1918 were abnormal. 
Today a readjustment to the normal of the years 1910 to 1916 is in 
process. 

In general, a study of this 30-year period makes it possible to see 
the extent to which a thoroughly anti-social business policy has 
plunged the anthracite industry into a vicious circle, which will 
mean the perpetuation of a certain degree of irregularity in employ¬ 
ment. 

In this table, and throughout the exhibit, the comparison empha¬ 
sized is that between the number of days worked in anthracite and 
the number worked in the Pennsylvania bituminous mines. This is 
done because of the similarity in determining factors between these 
two fields. Figures are also shown for the bituminous industry 7 for 
the country as a whole. But it should be pointed out that, what¬ 
ever comparison with the less comparable regions of the country 
may show, this will not in any sense vitiate the conclusions drawn 
from the comparison which is stressed. 

Pennsylvania bituminous mines are more comparable with the 
anthracite industry than are the other bituminous regions of the 
country not only from the human standpoint, but also from the 
point of view of market conditions, which tend to determine relative 
regularity of conditions. In both branches of the Pennsylvania 
mining industry the element of uncertainty characteristic of a com¬ 
petitive market has been largely eliminated. 

From the table above it appears that there are four periods which 
seem subject to slightly different influences so far as regularity of 
employment in anthracite is concerned. During the years 1881 to 
1891, inclusive, the days worked averaged over 200. Then followed 
a decade in which the average fell off approximately 30 days, the low 
point being reached in 1897. During the years immediately follow¬ 
ing the great strike of 1902 the number of days worked approximated 


11 


the average for the 80s, while the decade ending with the present 
shows a steady improvement. Except for the two abnormal years 
1917 and 1918, the average for this decade would appear to be 
about 243 days of operation to the year, which may probably be 
taken as a fair index of the present problem in the anthracite indus¬ 
try. This means some 61 days of idleness, or 20 per cent of the 
working year, in which the anthracite worker, through no fault of 
his own, is unable to earn a living. 

But the chief interest is in the future. Analysis of the past is 
only to give some basis for estimating the future. In order to gauge 
whether this average is likely to persist, or whether the decline 
which followed the abnormal years of war demand is likely to go 
on until the industry has returned to earlier conditions of greater 
irregularity, it will be necessary to consider previous periods more 
closely. 


12 


II. 

DETAILS OF DAYS WORKED FOR PERIOD 1881 TO 1891. 

The following table is drawn to show the factors influencing days 
worked for the period 1881 to 1891. (Sources as mentioned above.) 

DETAILS OF DAYS WORKED FOR PERIOD 1881 TO 1891. 


Anthracite. 


Year. | No. men | r-Av. tonnage per man—\| Days | Bituminous. 

[ employed. | day. year. | worked. I 



1 

1 

1881. 

76,031 

1.90 

420 

221 

! 

1882. 

82,200 

1.96 

427 

218 


1883. 

91,421 

1.81 

421 

232 


1884. 

101,073 

1.92 

368 

192 


1885. 

100,324 

1.87 

382 

204 


1886. 

103,044 

1.93 

379 

196 

(No data prior 

1887. 

106,517 

1.90 

395 

208 

to 1890) 

1888. 

122,218 

1.75 

381 

218 


1889. 

123,676 

1.90 

368 

194 


1890. 

126,000 

1.85 

369 

200 


1891. 

126,350 

1.98 

401 

203 


Average. 




208 








The outstanding feature of this table is the rapid increase in the 
number of men employed in the anthracite industry. In the course 
of 10 years approximately 66 per cent were added to the number 
employed in 1881. Between 1882 and 1883 the number increased 
by nearly 10,000. A similar increase was registered in the following 
year, while between 1887 and 1888 over 15,000 men were added to 
the army of anthracite workers. Meanwhile, with slight variations, 
the production per man per day remains almost constant. On the 
other hand, the anthracite production of the country increased, but 
not as rapidly as the working force. The consequence was a steady 
decrease in the number of days worked. 

These facts indicate that the anthracite industry was passing 
through the speculative period. The rapid growth of population 
and the cheapening of transportation caused a rapid development 
of the trade. The development of the West accentuated this increase 
in demand. Anthracite was looked upon as a good thing in the way 
of investment. The consequence was rapid expansion, the construe- 


























13 


tion of new collieries and the building of storage yards. This caused 
the increase in the number of anthracite workers. But, as is gener¬ 
ally the case, this period of competitive speculation caused produc¬ 
tion to increase beyond what the market could absorb. Conse¬ 
quently the steady increase in the number of days of non-operation, 
which was to reach a climax in the 90s, had begun. Attempts to 
control production in order to keep the price up proved futile. The 
industry was not yet ready for large combination. E. W. Parker, in 
“Mineral Resources of the United States,” 1889-90, comments upon 
the situation as follows: 

“The average number of days worked during the year 1889 
by the collieries was 194. The suspension of mining during 
periods aggregating about one-third of the year was caused 
mainly by the inability of the market to absorb a larger 
product.” (P. 243.) 

Thus, early in the history of the trade, “no market” was the chief 
cause of irregularity of employment. But it must be remembered 
that this was not due to irregularity in the market, but to over¬ 
investment in the industry. This fact of overinvestment has been a 
continuing influence since that time, and has been one of the prin¬ 
cipal causes of the low yearly earnings of the anthracite workers. 

During this period 1881-1891, anthracite had not been completely 
ruled out as industrial fuel. Consequently, investors counted upon 
the expansion of the market paralleling the expansion of industry. 
As a matter of fact, this has been the case with the bituminous 
market. Anthracite, on the other hand, soon became almost entirely 
a domestic fuel, its place in industry being taken by bituminous 
coal and coke. As a result, the expansion of the anthracite market 
has tended more and more to parallel the development of population. 


DIAGRAM SHOWING THE TENDENCY OF ANTHRACITE COAL PRODUCTION TO 
PARALLEL GROWTH OF POPULATION DURING YEARS 1856-1913, CON¬ 
TRASTED WITH INCREASE IN PRODUCTION OF BITUMINOUS COAL AS 
INDUSTRIAL FUEL. 

(From Mineral Resources of the U. S., 1913, Part II, p. 722.) 

YEAft 



SHORT TONS 




























































































































15 


III. 

PERIOD OF OVERPRODUCTION, 1892 to 1901. 


The full effects of the tendency mentioned in the preceding sec¬ 
tion were not apparent until the last decade of the nineteenth cen¬ 
tury. Then the results of unchecked competition for expected profits 
appeared in unemployment and high costs, which rendered the situ¬ 
ation even worse. The industry was operating in a vicious circle. 
Too much capital invested meant that the production had to 
carry so heavy an overhead that it could not compete for a market 
which bituminous was grabbing. Too many workers meant that the 
days of operation would have to be drastically curtailed. To meet 
this decrease in the opportunity to earn a living, the workers drove 
themselves to the limit to produce more per day, which only oper¬ 
ated further to decrease the number of days worked. It was a situa¬ 
tion which made the strike of 1902 inevitable. The development of 
the anthracite industry had been very badly managed. Not alone 
physical, but human resources were wasted. The following table 
tells the story, the sources being as mentioned above: 


Year. 

Anthracite. 

Bituminous. 

| 

j No. men 
| employed. 

I 

| r— Av. tonnage per man—> 
j day. year. 

Days 

worked. 

✓—Days worked-^ 
Penna. U. S. 

1892. 

129,050 

2.06 

407 

198 

223 

219 

1893. 

132,944 

2.06 

406 

197 

190 

204 

1894. 

131,603 

2.08 

395 

190 

165 

171 

1895. 

142,917 

2.07 

406 

196 

206 

194 

1896. 

148,991 

2.10 

365 

174 

206 

192 

1897. 

149,884 

2.34 

351 

150 

205 

196 

1898. 

145,504 

2.41 

367 

152 

229 

211 

1899. 

138,608 

2.50 

433 

173 

245 

234 

1900. 

144,206 

2.40 

398 

166 

242 

234 

1901. 

145,309 

2.37 

464 

196 

230 

225 

Average,.... 




179 

214 

208 









The outstanding fact in the above table is that the anthracite 
mine workers, through no fault of their own, were forced to be idle 
an average of 125 working days per year during the whole decade. 
Second only in importance to this is the fact that, despite overpro¬ 
duction, the number of workers in the industry continued to in- 


























16 


crease. Investment in the industry had been so unregulated that the 
working year amounted to a period of cut-throat competition for 
the “peak load.” To meet this and secure a share of the market 
which would carry the large investment, the companies kept an over¬ 
supply of labor, apportioning the work out among the workers. 

Overproduction meant competition and falling prices. To a large 
extent, the burden fell upon the worker. The market was demoral¬ 
ized. The situation is particularly evident in the figures for the 
years 1895-1898. An increase of over 10,000 in the number of work¬ 
ers in the industry, combined with the working of a few more days 
in the year, brought about such a state of oversupply that the 
market did not recover for a number of years. The number of days 
worked drops first to 174, then to 150 and 152. Not until 1898 had 
the number of workers begun to decline. And by that time the 
operators were taking steps to effect a combination with a view to 
restraining production. Speaking of this period, in “Mineral Re¬ 
sources of the United States,” 1897, E. W. Parker says: 


“In order to accomplish this result the mines were operated 
only three or four days in the week, but even with this restric¬ 
tion the supply of coal was lessened only about six per cent. 
It appears singular that with the working time cut down one- 
fourth or one-third the product is decreased only one-twelfth. 
The explanation is simple. During the busy season, when the 
mines are running full time, the miners rarely average as much 
as five days in the week, usually ‘laying off’ one or two week¬ 
days as well as Sunday. When the mines are running but half 
or two-thirds time every miner puts in all the time he can, and 
probably averages more tonnage per day than when he has all 
the work he wants.” (Page 13.) 

Later, in the same report, we find the following comment upon the 
oversupply of labor: 

“It may be opportune to mention at this time the difficulty 
presented by the labor question in the anthracite regions, viz., 
the overplus of miners and laborers. Thus, in tables in the 
beginning of this report it will be noted that although the 
product fell off over 3,000,000 tons in 1896 as compared with 
1895, the total number of employees increased 6,000. It will be 
seen at once that these men must have worked shorter time. 
This was the fact, and although wages, measured by day’s work, 
were higher in 1896, it is questionable whether the miners indi¬ 
vidually benefited to any great extent. It is evident, of course, 
that there are too many men for the amount of work to be done, 
but a remedy for the difficulty does not easily present itself. 


17 


While there is any likelihood of work the miners will not leave 
the vicinity of the mines, and the companies try so to apportion 
the work as to give all a chance, with the result that there is 
not enough work for any. 

“With a very much larger output this trouble would no doubt 
adjust itself; but that condition is not in sight in the near 
future. In the meantime it is a question whether it would not 
be better for the companies to give their old employees meas¬ 
urably steady employment and drop from the rolls all such 
as could not be thus provided for, allowing them to seek work 
elsewhere. (Pages 249-50.) 

This solution would not have fitted in with the policy of com¬ 
panies which were, as pointed out, fighting for as large a share of 
the “peak load” as they could handle. For this it was necessary to 
have on hand an abundance of cheap labor. In terms of such a mar¬ 
ket situation, it was to the interest of the competing companies to 
encourage workers to stay on part-time work. From the above it 
appears that this policy was definitely pursued. 

Other factors were entering into the situation. It was during this 
period that anthracite became entirely a domestic coal, its market 
responsive chiefly to changes in the weather, and to growth of popu¬ 
lation. And it is at this point that one comes face to face with the 
effect of over-investment. To quote E. W. Parker in “Mineral Re¬ 
sources of the United States” for 1897. 

“Mr. Wm. B. Ruley, in his contribution on the production of 
Pennsylvania anthracite, cites two reasons which have been 
assigned for the decrease in anthracite consumption. The first 
of these is the increased use of bituminous coal in competition 
with the smaller sizes of anthracite for steam raising; the 
second is the increased consumption of gas for cooking and 
other domestic purposes. To this must be added another 
factor—the decreased production of anthracite pig iron. The 
output of anthracite pig iron in 1897 was more than 200,000 
long tons less than in 1896, while the production of pig iron 
made from bituminous coal and coke increased nearly 1,300,000 
long tons. * * * 

“The three causes mentioned have undoubtedly had an ad¬ 
verse effect upon the anthracite interests. Nor is it practicable 
in the face of existing conditions to so reduce the selling price 
of anthracite coal that it may successfully meet the competition 
of bituminous coal, coke and gas. The success of these com¬ 
petitors of anthracite coal may be directly attributed to the 
unwisdom shown in over-developing the anthracite fields. 
Enormous outlays of capital in acquiring property and con¬ 
structing improvements in the boom days of anthracite de¬ 
velopment are reflected now in ‘fixed charges’ and other ex- 


18 


penses which make it impossible to materially decrease the cost 
of production. The facts brought out by the unfortunate af¬ 
fair at Hazleton during the summer of 1897 furnish reliable 
evidence that the miners are not overpaid. The rate per ton 
paid for mining is low enough now, and as the mines are fre¬ 
quently closed down one-third or one-half the time the em¬ 
ployees are necssarily unable to earn more than two-thirds of 
the wages possible if they were allowed to work full time. As 
will be seen further on, the miners endeavor to make up for 
this, in part, by mining more coal per day than they are ac¬ 
customed to when the mines are running regularly. But such 
efforts do not offset the losses they suffer through compulsory 
idleness.” 

This last paragraph merely shows the vicious circle into which the 
eagerness for profits had plunged the anthracite industry. In the 
next paragraph Mr. Parker completes the picture: 

"It would seem that with a restricted production and prices 
well controlled the anthracite interests would be in excellent 
condition, so far as the operators are concerned; but restricted 
production and higher prices have reflex actions upon industry 
which are not always considered. In the first place, when 
tonnage is reduced the mining cost of every ton of the product 
won, owing to the regularity and uniformity of the ‘fixed 
charges/ etc., is proportionately increased, while every addi¬ 
tional advance in the price produces a diminution in the 
market demand, and offers an opportunity for the increased 
consumption of soft coal, coke or gas, as the case may be. 
Under the prevailing conditions there is reason to believe that 
the maximum of anthracite production has been, or soon will 
be, reached. It is certainly safe to predict that the demand 
will never exceed the present capacity of the anthracite mines.” 

In other words, the problem of regularity, or irregularity, of em¬ 
ployment in the anthracite industry is primarily a question of a 
balance between the development of the field and the market. And 
already outside conditions were coming into being which fore¬ 
shadowed the day when the anthracite industry would have reached 
a state of equilibrium. If the market had ceased to advance with 
the workers in the hopeless state prevalent in the last years of the 
nineteenth century, the anthracite region would indeed have been 
a blot upon the industrial page of the nation. The situation, created 
by bad management, was the primary basis for the series of strikes 
which followed in 1900, 1902 and 1906. 

The fact has been pointed out that anthracite was becoming pri¬ 
marily a domestic coal. Already there was beginning to be compe- 


19 


tition in this field as well not only from gas as a cooking fuel, but 
also from the fact that the great office buildings and apartment- 
houses had begun to grow. In these bituminous steam coal was used 
for heating in place of anthracite. 

A glance at the reports of the Pennsylvania Bureau of Mines 
shows the same feeling that the development of the anthracite mines 
had outdistanced the market. The report for 1898 reads as follows: 

“The market for anthracite coal has apparently reached its 
limit. It is true there is an increase in 1898 of 197,821 tons 
over 1897; but that is in all probability due to the extraor¬ 
dinarily severe weather that prevailed. It appears from the 
number of days that the mines were in operation during the 
year that the mines now opened and number of men employed, 
are capable of producing very much more coal, which shows 
that there are more mines opened and more men employed than 
are necessary to supply the demand.” * * * 

The feeling among experts at this time seems to have been that, 
with the limited district in which anthracite is found, the production 
per day would remain at slightly over 300,000 tons, and that the 
question of the number of days worked would be determined largely 
by the number of these 300,000-ton units required by the market. 
All along there is no doubt but that market is the determinant. 


t 


20 


IV. 

PERIOD OF ORGANIZATION OF THE MARKET FOR 
DOMESTIC COAL, 1903 TO 1908. 

With the beginning of the twentieth century the period of irre¬ 
sponsible competition was over. Both labor and capital in the indus¬ 
try were organizing, which meant regulation in the future. The first 
important step was taken by the companies when they announced 
the summer discount policy. This tended to regularize the market— 
that is, to spread its demands evenly over the full year. 

Speaking of this summer discount policy, the Pennsylvania De¬ 
partment of Mines Report for 1904 said: 

“The demand for domestic sizes continued remarkably even 
throughout the year owing to the operation of the discount 
plan. By this plan a discount of 50 cents a ton from the sched¬ 
ule price is offered on purchases made in April, with a gradual 
decrease of 10 cents a month in the discount during May, June, 
July and August. This method insures a more even distribu¬ 
tion of coal throughout the year. The retail dealers and house¬ 
holders have a special inducement to make early purchases, 
which are stored for winter use, thus maintaining the tonnage 
during a period generally characterized by inactivity and reduc- 
in proportionately the danger of congestion in shipping later 
in the season.” * * * 

Speaking of the contrast between the periods before and after this 
step was taken, E. W. Parker, in the 1913 “Mineral Resources of the 
United States,” says: 

“It will be observed that in the anthracite mines during the 
last decade of the 19th century there was a notably decreasing 
tendency in the number of days the workers in the anthracite 
mines were able to work, until in 1897 and 1898 they barely 
averaged 50 per cent of the possible working days in the year, 
excluding Sundays and legal holidays. These figures substan¬ 
tiate the claim made about that time that the anthracite min¬ 
ers were unable to earn a total living wage. The consumption 
of the prepared sizes of anthracite being almost exclusively for 
domestic purposes, the production was at a ‘peak load’ during 
the fall and winter months, with long periods of idleness dur¬ 
ing the summer. In- order to meet the demands of the ‘peak 
loads’ it was necessary to keep on the rolls a much larger num¬ 
ber of men than if steady employment could be given the year 
round. * * * Beginning with 1903, however, a marked im¬ 

provement is shown in the working time made by the anthracite 


21 


miners. From 1892 to 1902, inclusive, the anthracite mine 
workers did not average as much as 200 days in any one year, 
and the general average for the period was 173 days. Since 
1903, on the other hand, the anthracite miners have averaged 
less than 200 days in only one year, 1906, when there was an 
extended suspension pending the renewal of the anthracite 
strike commission’s awards, and the general average of the 
period has been 220 days, 47 days or 27 per cent more than 
the general average for the earlier period.” * * * 


The following table gives the data for this period of readjustment: 


Year. 

Anthracite. 

Bituminous. 

No. men | 
| employed. ^ 

r— Av. tonnage per man—>> 

| day. year. 

Days 

worked. 

/—Days worked—>> 
Penna. U. S. 

1903. 

150,483 

1 

2.41 

496 

206 

235 

225 

1904. 

155,861 

2.35 

469 

200 

196 

202 

1905. 

163,406 

2.19 

470 

215 

231 

211 

1906. 

162,355 

2.25 

439 

195 

231 

213 

1907. 

167,234 

2.33 

512 

220 

255 

234 

1908. 

174,174 

2.39 

478 

200 

201 

193 

Average.... 




206 

225 

213 


During this period, although the average for such years as 1902, 
1906 and 1909 is considerably influenced by the serious stoppages 
of work which occurred pending the adjustment of disputes between 
the mine workers and the operators, the general average for the 
period, 206 days, is primarily an index of market conditions. This 
is the result of the fact that adjustment every three years had be¬ 
come the regular thing, for which preparation was made in the pre¬ 
ceding year. The succeeding year was also, to a large degree, in¬ 
fluenced by compensatory production. Thus we notice in the table 
that the year of stoppage, 1906, is preceded and followed by years 
during which the number of days operated was relatively high. In 
this connection we find the following comment upon the year 1903 
in the report of the Pennsylvania Department of Mines: 


“The long and disastrous strike of 1902 had depleted the 
supply of coal to such an extent that it required full and con¬ 
tinuous work at the mines for the first 10 months of 1903 to 
restore the normal conditions of the trade in this country and 
in Canada. During November and December, however, the pro- 






















22 


duction was greatly curtailed, owing to a cessation, in the de¬ 
mand, and most of the operations closed down completely on 
the 24th of the latter month.” * * * 

So again, in the publication of the United States Geological Sur¬ 
vey, “Mineral Resources of the United States,” a hint is given to the 
same effect. Speaking of the high average days worked in 1905, Mr. 
Parker writes: 


“This average for the anthracite mine workers was the high¬ 
est recorded in the 16 years that the statistics have been ob¬ 
tained, and was probably due to the efforts put forth by the 
operating companies to lay in a large supply of coal in anticipa¬ 
tion of a strike when the award of the anthracite coal commis¬ 
sion expired in the spring of 1906.” 

As a matter of fact, the extraordinarily low averages of the ’90s 
no longer prevailed. The relation between the market and the sup¬ 
ply existing in the ’80s had to all intents and purposes been re¬ 
established. Experts considered that the market w r as about equal 
to the supply, and, as the increase in number of workers in the in¬ 
dustry tended to parallel the slow increase of the market, it would 
seem as though 206 odd days were considered as constituting a fair 
year’s work in the anthracite fields. 

During this period experts remark increasingly on the probability 
that the anthracite industry has reached its high-water mark. This 
opinion is based chiefly upon the increasing cost of production, which 
tends to handicap anthracite in competition with other fuels. In any 
final judgment as to the probable employment in the industry in 
the future this factor must be considered. It is remarked that a 
portion of this increased cost is due to the fact that the workers 
themselves are producing a smaller quantity per day. But the men 
giving this opinion are not always careful enough to state that this 
decrease in the productivity may largely be accounted for by the 
increasing difficulty of mining as the seams are worked farther and 
farther, often becoming thinner as the mines go deeper. 

Days Worked in Pennsylvania Anthracite Mines Compared 
with Other Mining Countries. 

In the 1906 report of the Pennsylvania Department of Mines there 
is a small table showing for the period now being considered the 
comparative time worked in certain coal-producing countries as com- 


23 


pared witli Penns 3 'lvania anthracite. The table is here reproduced, 
in order to show to what extent the American anthracite miner is 
suffering from irregularity of employment more than his fellows in 
other countries. With the average days worked in the other coun¬ 
tries standing at 282, it must be obvious that the mines in those 
countries have not been subject to the unregulated exploitation from 
which the miners in the United States have been the chief sufferers. 


DA\S WORKED IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES. 


Pennsylvania anthracite (1903). 

211 

Great Britain bituminous (1903). 

264 

Germany, bituminous (1903). 

274 

France, bituminous (1900). 

296 

Belgium, bituminous (1902). 

289 

Austria, bituminous (1903). 

289 


Average for foreign countries. 

282 
















24 


V. 


THE ANTHRACITE INDUSTRY 
DECADE. 


DURING THE 


FAST 


From the preceding pages it is evident that the problem of regu¬ 
larity in the anthracite industry is primarily a problem of the 
ability of the market to absorb the full production of the labor 
employed. It appears that this market is chiefly responsive to 
weather conditions and to the growth of population. From the time 
when the summer discount was introduced the steady growth of 
population has tended to improve the very bad conditions which re¬ 
sulted from the speculative overinvestment in the industry. But 
other factors were coming into play which tended more and more to 
render it doubtful whether the industry would ever reach full-time 
operation, "with these facts in mind, it would appear, from an 
examination of data for the decade ending with the present time, 
that the average for the years 1910 to 1916, inclusive, will be found 
to represent approximately the best average days worked that can 
be expected from the industry. In other words, it represents a real 
balance between the demands of the market and the possible pro¬ 
duction of the limited mining area, which will not be exceeded, and 
which may tend toward a slow decline, for reasons which will be 
noted. The average for these years is 242 days of operation, which 
corresponds almost exactly with the days worked in the Pennsyl¬ 
vania bituminous mines for the same years. The correspondence 
is even closer than the rough average shows, the exact figures being 
for the anthracite mines, 241.57, and for the bituminous mines, 
241.29. In other words, taking the full number of days worked for 
the seven years, it will be found that the totals differ by only two 
days, being 1691 and 1689, respectively. This would certainly seem 
to indicate relative stabilization of the situation in Pennsylvania at 
approximately 242 working days, which means a loss to the workers 
of some 63 possible working days each year, or something over 20 
per cent of the year. The exact figures appear in the following 
table • 


25 



Anthracite. 

Bituminous. 

Year. 

No. men 

r- Av. tonnage per man—\ | 

Days | 

r— Days worked—' 


employed. 

day. 

year. 

worked. 

Penna. 

U. S. 

1910. 

169,497 

2.17 

498 

229 

238 

217 

1911. 

173,940 

2.11 

520 

246 

233 

211 

1912. 

174,030 

2.10 

485 

231 

252 

233 

1913. 

175,745 

2.03 

521 

257 

267 

232 

1914. 

179,679 

2.06 

505 

245 

214 

195 

1915. 

176,552 

2.19 

504 

230 

226 

203 

1916. 

159,869 

2.16 

548 

253 

259 

230 

Average. 




242 

241 

219 






With the beginning of this period the production of anthracite 
had reached a level at which it appeared likely to remain. In other 
words, despite the growth of population, it appeared that other con¬ 
ditions, such as the movement to steam-heated apartment-houses, 
etc., were likely to prove a counter influence. In “Mineral Resources 
of the United States” for 1913, it is remarked: 

“The increase in the use of artificial gas and coke for domestic 
purposes will probably keep pace with the increase of popula¬ 
tion in the markets supplied by anthracite, and there is little 
probability that the production of anthracite will show any 
marked increase in the future. Changes in temperature and 
labor conditions will continue to be the most important factors 
affecting the production of anthracite.” 

Anthracite had almost ceased to respond to ordinary business 
changes, in which characteristic it differed radically from bitumi¬ 
nous coal. And the belief that the maximum regular production of 
anthracite had been reached seems to be borne out by the fact that 
the estimated production for 1919 is very slightly in excess of that 
for 1910, and distinctly less than that for 1911. In short, the pro¬ 
duction of anthracite may be expected to average under 90,000,000 
tons per year. In the year of abnormal demand, 1917, which will 
be mentioned later, although the production reached nearly 100,000,- 
000 tons, less than 94,000,000 tons of this was actually consumed. 
Thus, in an attempt to estimate the regularity of employment, the 
number of days required to produce 86,000,000-odd tons with the 
labor in the industry should probably be taken as maximum. 

Before turning to consider the abnormal years 1917-1918, a few 
























26 


facts which, appear in the above table should be noted. In the first 
place, it is again to be noticed that the fewer days worked in the year 
of adjustment, 1012, are compensated by the higher averages for 
the years preceding and following. In the second place, it appears 
that the increase in number of days worked during this period as 
contrasted with the previous period may be in part due to the fact 
that the mine worker is producing considerably less per day. In 
fact, the two changes seem to be very closely parallel to each other. 
And, finally, it may be noticed that the number of workers in the 
industry, having reached a maximum in 1914, has begun a very 
decided decline, there being approximately 20,000 less workers in 
1916 than in 1914. As a matter of fact, this decline continued until 
in 1918 there were only approximately 147,000 working in the an¬ 
thracite mines, a figure below any since 1902. 

This last tendency is important from two points of view. In the 
first place, the increased number of days worked during the last 
four years corresponds to a shortage of labor from the point of view 
of the companies. This means that if that shortage of labor is made 
up, fewer days will again prevail. In the second place, it means 
that irregular, low-paid work in the anthracite industry proved 
unattractive when contrasted with the opportunities in the expand¬ 
ing munitions industry of the years mentioned. The decrease in the 
number of anthracite workers represents a drift to the manufactur¬ 
ing industries. 


The Eight-Hour Day and the Regularity of Employment. 

In order to forestall the possible contention that the eight-hour 
day, in effect since 1916, can be held responsible for the increased 
number of working days in 1917 and 1918, the tables presented in 
this exhibit include figures as to the tonnage produced per man per 
day. The contention has already been advanced to the effect that 
the number of days of work in the years 1910 to 1916 would have 
been considerably increased had an equivalent eight-hour day been 
substituted for the nine-hour day actually worked. The actual fig¬ 
ures disprove any such assertion. Every competent industrial engi¬ 
neer is cognizant of the fact that a reduction in hours per day may 
actually tend to increase rather than to decrease the productivity 
of the worker. The important question in an industry where the 
number of days worked is determined by the demands of the market 


27 


is in reality the number of tons that would be required from each 
man employed. As the miners are paid on a tonnage basis, this will 
be the figure which will determine whether they are adequately or 
inadequately paid. 

If the attempt is made to ascertain the number of equivalent eight - 
hour days which were worked during the years 1910 and 1916, when 
a nine-hour day was effective, not by multiplying by nine-eighths, 
but on the basis of tons produced, the unexpected conclusion is 
reached that on an eight-hour-day basis fewer rather than more days 
would have been worked. A glance at the tables will show that the 
mine workers produced more coal per man per day in the eight-hour 
years 1916 to 1918 than they did in the nine-hour years 1910 to 1915. 
This information can be segregated in a table, as follows: 


PRODUCTION PER MAN PER DAY AND DAYS WORKED, COVERING 
9-HOUR AND 8-HOUR YEARS. 


Year. 

Tons per man 
per day. 

Days worked 
per year. 

Equivalent 8-hr. 
days on basis of 
of average 
production. 

1910 (9 hours). 

2.17 

229 


1911 (9 hours). 

2.11 

246 


1912 (9 hours). 

2.10 

231 


1913 (9 hours). 

2.03 

257 


1914 (9 hours). 

2.06 

245 


1915 (9 hours). 

2.19 

230 


Average.. 

2.11 

1 240 

226 

1916 (8 hours after April). 

2.16 

253 


1917 (8 hours). 

2.27 

285 


1918 (8 hours). 

2.28 

293 


Average. 

2.24 




Obviously, if during the nine-hour years the worker had produced 
as much coal per man per day as during the succeeding eight-hour 
years, they would have worked only 226 days per year instead of 
240 to meet the demands of the market. In other words, the indus¬ 
try would have been more irregular than it actually was. 

That production may increase when hours are decreased is sub¬ 
stantiated by the experience of the short-hour mines of Durham and 
Northumberland, in England. Mr. Cunningham, Assistant Under 
Secretary for the Home Department, in his evidence before the 
























28 


Miners’ Eight-Hour-Day Committee in 1907, said, in commenting 
upon a reduction of 12y 2 hours per week in the mines above referred 
to: 

“We have every right to presume that the production did go up 
while the hours went down.” 

This committee of the British Government, the recommendations 
of which led to the Eight-Hour Law, summarizes its conclusions 
from evidence as follows: 

“Nevertheless, after making allowance for this governing fact, 
and comparing like with like, so far as the evidence enables us 
to do so, we cannot but conclude that an hour’s work of the 
men employed in East and West Scotland, Northumberland 
and Durham, where the hours of work are shortest, is more 
effective than it is in Lancashire and South Wales, where the 
hours are longest. The tables do not show a uniform propor¬ 
tionate correspondence, but they do show some general rela¬ 
tion between short hours and efficient work.” 

Such facts as these, which are today well known to industrial 
experts, show the impossibility of reducing the actual day’s work 
to any equivalent basis merely on the basis of number of hours 
worked. For this reason the 242 days average for the period under 
consideration stands as a conservative estimate of the irregularity 
prevalent in the industry under normal market conditions. Had 
the market for the year 1917 to 1918 been normal and the usual sup¬ 
ply of labor been available, such production per man per day as pre¬ 
vailed in those years would have resulted in greater irregularity 
than that shown as the average for the preceding years. 

The Years 1917 to 1918 Not an Index of Regularity. 

As already pointed out, the years 1910 to 1919 cannot be averaged 
together as a homogeneous period to show that the growth of popu¬ 
lation is actually bringing about regularity in the industry. The 
following table shows conclusively that the years 1917 to 1918 
stand apart as abnormal years. The production figures used in this 
table were prepared by the mine operators. 


29 


CONTRAST BETWEEN NORMAL AND ABNORMAL YEARS IN ANTHRACITE 

INDUSTRY. 




Production 





Prepared and pea 

Steam sizes 

Days 

No. of men 

Year. 

' 1 

(tons). 

(tons). 

worked. 

employed. 

1912. 

45,678,201 


17,932,377 

231 

174,030 

1913. 

50,594,305 


18,475,323 

257 

175,745 

1914. 

49,998,507 


18,344,094 

245 

179,679 

1915. 

48,944,747 


18,939,029 

230 

176,552 

1916 . 

Average .. 

1917 . 

48,245,724 

48,692,297 

19,130,640 

253 

159,869 

53,487,277 

23,646,028 

285 

154,174 

1918 . 

Average .. 

1919 . 

51,974,714 

52,730,992 

24,675,204 

293 

147,121 

48,991,572 

17,863,739 

(252-273) 

152,000 


This shows the very interesting fact that the production figures 
for 1915, 1916 and 1919 are approximately equal. They are approxi¬ 
mately equal to the average production for the years 1912-1916. 
This would seem to indicate that during the last decade the anthra¬ 
cite market has reached a relatively stable position with an average 
production in domestic sizes of approximately 48,000,000 tons. In 
contrast with this average, the years 1917, 1918, with the production 
of domestic sizes 8 per cent higher, and an even greater increase in 
the production of steam sizes, appear distinctly abnormal. 

This abnormal condition of the market has been recognized by 
practically all authorities engaged in observing the course of the 
industry. In this connection the following quotations and various 
Government reports are interesting: 


“There has undoubtably been an immense artificial demand 
for anthracite this spring. Thousands of householders who 
normally do not buy until fall have this year poured in their 
orders in April and May.” (P. 31.) 

“The greater consumption of large sizes of anthracite by gas 
and carbon plants and by railroads has caused an increase in 
demand for these sizes. This is due largely to the fact that coal 
which formerly came into competition with anthracite coal has 
been diverted to other uses. Many gas plants which in the 
past have been making coke as a by-product, some in competi¬ 
tion with anthracite, have very materially curtailed their out¬ 
put because of the high price of soft coal. Large manufactur¬ 
ing plants which use coke in connection with their manufactur- 

























30 


ing processes have turned to anthracite on account of the 
shortage in coke. * * * Public utilities in some parts of 

the country have been affected to a considerable extent by the 
shortage of coke and have substituted anthracite for it. And 
unprecedented industrial activity created a growing demand 
for steam sizes by manufacturing plants regularly using an¬ 
thracite. * * * 

“The great expansion of industrial activity in the steel, the 
cotton textile, and the munition industries accounts for a ma¬ 
terial increase in the consumption and demand for bituminous 
coal, which in turn has indirectly placed an added demand 
on the anthracite supply by industries that could substitute 
anthracite when bituminous could not be had or when the price 
of bituminous was higher than that of anthracite.” * * * 

(Pp. 84-85, report of Fed. Trade Com. on Anthracite and 
Bit. Coal, June, 1917.) 

“The requirements of the country for anthracite for domes¬ 
tic use, for the military uses of the government, for water gas 
manufacture, and for industrial purposes to replace coke 
withdrawn for the iron industry, were greater in 1917 than in 
in any previous year. * * * 

“The shortage of bituminous coal in the Eastern States was 
pronounced throughout the year, and the fine sizes of anthra¬ 
cite were eagerly sought as a substitute for mixture with bi¬ 
tuminous coal by industrial plants, especially during the last 
third of the year.” * * * (P. 1014 Mineral Resources of 

U. S., 1917.) 

In connection with the shortage of labor, after remarking on the 
drift of low paid mine labor to the munitions industries and upon 
the fact that this did not result in a corresponding decrease in pro¬ 
duction, the Federal Trade Report makes the following interesting 
comment: 


“From these facts it is clear that great credit is due to the 
miners and to the mining companies. Apparently the remain¬ 
ing labor force, though working only 8 hours a day instead of 9, 
was more efficient and the companies managed their operations 
so as to produce the maximum possible under the difficulties en¬ 
countered.” (P. 35.) 

These quotations may be supplemented from the weekly bulletins 
of the Geological Survey for the year 1919 as follows: 

“The total output since the beginning of the coal year is 
naturally far short of that of last year, when an abnormal de¬ 
mand for anthracite was created by the shortage of bitumi¬ 
nous.” (Sept. 27, 1919.) 


31 


‘‘To compare 1919 with the exceptional years of the war is 
perhaps deceptive. A more instructive comparison can be had 
between the first six months of the coal years beginning April 
1, 1919, and 1916, etc.” * * * (October 11, 1919.) 

Labor Shortage and Regularity of Employment in 1917 and 1918. 

Perhaps even more significant a cause of the abnormal regularity 
of employment in the industry during 1917-1918 was the shortage 
of labor caused by the war. The close correspondence between 
number of mine workers and number of days worked per year ap¬ 
pears clearly in the above table. The average number of men em¬ 
ployed in the anthracite industry for the abnormal years 1917-1918 
was 150,647. As contrasted with the average for the previous six 
years, 173,502, this shows a falling off of over 22,000. In other 
words, during these years of abnormal regularity there were 15 
per cent, fewer workers producing 8 per cent, more coal to meet the 
demand for domestic sizes. This takes no account of the extra men 
required to produce the additional steam sizes. Clearly it required 
labor shortage coupled with a highly artificial demand to bring 
about regularity even approximating a full working year in the an¬ 
thracite industry. 

As a concrete illustration of the way in which the decrease in num¬ 
ber of men employed actually increases the regularity of employ¬ 
ment we might take the year 1918. In contrast with this year the 
average of men employed in the years prior to the war was 20 per 
cent, higher. As already pointed out the question of adequate em¬ 
ployment may be considered either in terms of the number of tons 
w r hich the market requires per worker or in terms of the number of 
days which the mine operates to meet the demand. Assuming that 
the average requirements of the market amount to 90,000,000 tons 
annually of all kinds of anthracite this would mean that each 
worker would have hypothetical opportunity to produce 600 tons per 
year when the smaller number of men were employed as contrasted 
with 523 tons, per year with the normal labor force on hand. In 
terms of number of days worked the conclusion is even more in¬ 
teresting. In order to meet the market requirements in 1918 with 
approximately 147,000 workers, 293 working days were required; if 
the number of workers had been 20 per cent, higher as was the case 
prior to the war it would have required only 252 days to satisfy the 
market. This represents approximately the best estimate as to the 
probable number of working days in the industry under normal con¬ 
ditions. 


32 


Following tlie conclusion of the war, conditions in the industry 
have been steadily returning to normal. As shown in the analysis 
of the production figures prepared by the operators, the production 
of coal for 1919 was approximately the average for the years 1910 
to 1916, during which the mine workers were unemployed for twenty 
per cent of the year. The other determining factor, labor shortage, 
is also being reduced to normal. According to the weekly report 
of the Geological Survey for August 9, 1919, “it is reported that the 
supply of labor in the anthracite regions is improving.” This is 
confirmed by the figures submitted by the operators which show that 
nearly 5,000 men have been added since the lowest point was reached 
in 1918. The fact of over-investment in the industry is therefore 
operating again to bring more labor into anthracite mining than 
the annual market would require if regular conditions of employ¬ 
ment were maintained. 

In other words, an analysis of the forces which determine con¬ 
ditions of employment in the anthracite industry will lead to the 
conviction that the forces in operation since the war have been 
steadily reducing the industry to approximately the condition which 
prevailed during the years which averaged 242 days of operation. 
The market required no more prepared and pea coal in 1919 than it 
averaged for the years 1912-1916. The weekly bulletins issued by 
the Geological Survey show a steady decline in the requirements 
of the market following the armistice. 

The Year 1919 Not Completely Normal. 

Even the year 1919 cannot be considered as a completely normal 
year. The market would have required less coal from the anthracite 
mines in 1919 had it not been for the artificial situation created 
by the bituminous strike. This is clearly shown in the reports of 
anthracite production compiled week by week at the U. S. Geo¬ 
logical Survey. To quote the comments of this weekly report: 

“Anxiety felt by consumers over the impending bituminous 
strike was reflected in the demand for anthracite, production 
of which reached a new high level for the year.” (Nov. 1, 
1919.) 

“The anthracite industry responded to the stimulus of ac¬ 
tive demand caused by the soft coal strike with the largest 
production of the year.” (Nov. 29, 1919.) 

“The output of anthracite during the week ended December 
6 continued at the high rate maintained since the commence¬ 
ment of the bituminous strike.” (Dec. 13, 1919.) 


33 


‘‘Responding to the active demand caused by the growing 
shortage of bituminous coal the output of anthracite during the 
week ended December 13, rose to the highest level attained this 
year—indeed, the highest in any week since September, 1918.” 
(Dec. 20, 1919.) 

In other words, had it not been for this abnormal demand during 
the last weeks of 1919, the production of that year would have been 
lower than the figure shown by several hundred thousand tons. 

The year 1919 also shows a continuation of the shortage of labor 
which existed during the war, although the industry had started to 
return to its pre-war quota. As this increase in the number of 
workers continues, it will mean some increase in the production 
per day with a consequent reduction of the number of days neces¬ 
sary to produce for the market. 


Less Complicating Factors in Anthracite Than in Bituminous 

Mining. 

In general it might be remarked that there are less complicating 
factors in the anthracite branch of the coal industry than in bitu¬ 
minous. Whereas over 50 per cent of bituminous coal is produced 
by machinery, with the use of machinery increasing, it has not yet 
been found possible to use machines in anthracite except to a 
to a very limited extent, approximately 2 per cent of the coal being 
so produced. This means that the problem of regularity will not 
be immediately affected by a rapid increase in the productive capac¬ 
ity of the individual worker. 

Again, it may be noted that the problem of “car shortage” is not 
so serious in the anthracite industry as in bituminous. This is 
explained by the Federal Trade Commission Report as follows: 

“In the anthracite industry, where the initial anthracite 
railroads are identified or affiliated w T ith the larger mining com¬ 
panies, the transportation difficulties are less serious than in 
the bituminous industry. With minor exceptions the car sup¬ 
ply for the production of coal at the anthracite mines seems 
adequate.” 

The Commission obtained statistics relating to the railroad car 
supply at the operations of fifteen anthracite mining companies. 
Their consolidated tabulation is given below 7 . 


34 


ESTIMATED RAILROAD-CAR TONNAGE REQUIREMENTS OF 13 ANTHRA¬ 
CITE MINING COMPANIES, AND ESTIMATED COMMERCIAL TONNAGE 
LOST THROUGH AN INADEQUATE CAR SUPPLY BY MONTHS, 1915 AND 
1916. (GROSS TONS). 


Month. 

Estimated commercial 
shipments if fully 
supplied with cars. 

Tonnage shipped. 

|Estim. produc. of coml. 

tonnage lost thru an 
| inadequate car supply. 


1915 

1916 

1915 

1916 

1915 

1916 

January . 

3,250,582 

4,417,709 

3,141,210 

4,097,664 

109,372 

320,045 

February . 

2,959,208 

4,369,660 

2,836,550 

3,976,877 

122,658 

392,783 

March . 

3,486,654 

4,894,091 

3,338,020 

4,394,644 

148,634 

499,447 

April . 

4,604,499 

3,279,103 

4,605,631 

3,073,936 

*379 

205,167 

May . 

4,136,732 

3,950,546 

4,051,140 

3,776,639 

85,592 

173,907 

June . 

3,734,623 

4,077,789 

3,699,578 

3,989,027 

335,045 

88,762 

July .. 

3,469,623 

3,917,704 

3,389,589 

3,820,079 

80,034 

97,625 

August . 

3,661,909 

4,084,790 

3,626,009 

3,965,309 

35,900 

119,481 

September . 

3,799,054 

4,083,075 

3,811,188 

3,866,956 

*2,396 

216,119 

October . 

4,659,901 

4,292,709 

4,562,631 

4,138,915 

97,270 

153,794 

November . 

4,557,863 

4,402,371 

4,467,130 

4,299,327 

90,733 

103,044 

December . 

4,553,814 

4,179,373 

4,176,305 

4,076,594 

377,509 

102,779 

Total 14 Co.’s.. 

46,874,462 

49,948,920 

45,704,981 

47,475,967 

1,185,522 

2,472,953 

1 Co. 12 mos... 

4,642,807 

5,137,916 

4,562,925 

4,413,507 

79,882 

724,409 

Tl. 15 companies 

51,517,269 

55,086,836 

50,267,906 

51,889,474 

1,265,404 

3,197,362 


The data in the preceding table represent returns from companies 
shipping 72.6 per cent of the commercial shipments of anthracite 
during 1915 and 76.2 per cent of the commercial shipments during 
1916. The loss in potential production resulting from inadequate 
railroad car supply was for the above years, 1,265,404 gross tons 
and 3,197,362 gross tons, respectively. This meant a loss totaling 
only 2.517 per cent of their combined commercial shipments in 
1915, and 6.161 per cent of these shipments in 1916. Thus it appears 
that although the figure rose somewhat in 1916, the problem of car 
shortage is not acute in the anthracite industry. 

There is one other factor which has been referred to from time 
to time which must be mentioned again, i. e. idleness due to strikes. 
From the previous discussion the impression may have been gained 
that the degree of idleness due to such strikes was very considerable. 


x One company reported car tonnage furnished in excess of shipments, 1,511 tons 
in ApriJ, 1915, and 14,530 tons in September, 1915. 
































35 


A diagram has been prepared recently by the U. S. Geological Sur¬ 
vey in order to gain some idea of the extent to which strikes are a 
factor in non-operation in the coal industry. As shown in the 
diagram, idleness due to strikes has, during the period 1910-1918, 
amounted to but a little over one-tenth of the total days of non¬ 
operation. And here it should be pointed out again that, except 
for the strike of 1902, which has been left out in reckoning the gen¬ 
eral average, the strikes have not materially affected the average 
because they indirectly caused a compensatory greater number of 
days worked in the preceding and succeeding years. 


36 


VI. 

PROBABLE IRREGULARITY IN THE FUTURE. 

1 ti estimating the probable number of days which will be worked 
in (he anthracite industry under present circumstances, two broad 
facts must be considered, (1) the market requirements and (2) 
Ihe number of men employed. There is of course a third variant, 
the production per man per day. The fact that this third item 
enters creates a very interesting situation. Given certain market 
requirements and a certain number of workers, the setting of a low 
rate by forcing the men to speed up production for the sake of gain¬ 
ing adequate earnings tends to cause them to produce the supply 
in fewer days. Thus low rates in the industry will place the workers 
in a dilemma in which they have a choice between earning more per 
day with fewer days in which to earn the annual wage, or extend¬ 
ing the same annual earning over a greater number of days. This 
really points to the abnormal condition of the industry. 

Briefly summarized, the forces operating to determine the present 
situation in the industry might be stated as follows: 

(1) Competitive over-investment and inflated capitalization 
have provided the industry with a burden of overhead w T hich it has 
been forced to carry since the market was organized on a more 
or less non-competitive basis. 

(2) This situation rendered high prices necessary. These were 
maintained in part by artificial limitation of the supply through 
the organization of the market on a non-competitive basis. 

(3) There resulted a growing encroachment of low-price bitu¬ 
minous coal, fuel oil and gas upon the various branches of the 
anthracite market. This first limited the growth of the anthracite 
market to the steady increase in population, and finally tended to 
cut in even upon the domestic market. 

(4) During the last decade these forces have tended to produce 
a state of equilibrium at what is probably very nearly the maximum 
-steady production which the anthracite industry will attain. In 
other words, general opinion confirms the belief that the anthracite 
market reached its normal level during the years just preceding the 
war and that it is not likely to exceed this level in the near future. 
With a normal labor force, therefore, it cannot be expected that the 
anthracite industry will exceed an average of 250 days operation. 
Variation below this figure will be determined primarily by market 


37 


conditions. The probable average of days of operation is more likely 
to approximate 242 days. In other words, the most optimistic 
view possible can promise the anthracite mine worker scarcely more 
than 80 per cent employment. He is faced with the probability 
of at least 60 working days in which he will be unable, through no 
fault of his own, to earn a living wage. 

Ju connection with this estimate it should be pointed out that 
were the abnormal conditions of the war years to continue, the 
anthracite industry will probably prove unable to maintain steady 
operation at anything like the rates shown for those years. Accord¬ 
ing to the report of the Pennsylvania Department of Mines for 1903 

“The number of working days * * * can hardly exceed 

250 in the year, as the repairs to the mines, inside and outside, 
require many weeks, and the loss of several weeks more is 
caused by various accidents, explosions, flooding and cave-ins 
of mines, and breaking of machinery. ,, 

In fact, in forming any estimate it must be recognized that, as in 
the case of so many other industries, the exigencies of war pro¬ 
duced a straining to accomplish the necessary work which tended 
to neglect the usual repairs and the upkeep of various material 
parts of the various mine property. Such a pace could not be main¬ 
tained for a long period. 




















































































































